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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 860068

-vKIP ROLAND PARKIN,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issue is presented upon appeal:
1. When all elements of the crimes of theft were
either admitted or stipulated to by the appellant, except the
element of "intent" to commit the crime, and the jury found the
appellant not guilty of theft, may the appellant be convicted of
"attempted theft" which requires the same "intent" as does the
crime of "theft?"
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, KIP ROLAND PARKIN, was charged by
amended information with six counts of theft, each a 3rd degree
felony under sections 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 of Utah Code
Annotated 1913, as amended. (R 22-23)

Appellant pled not guilty

and a jury trial was held December 11th and 12th, 1985, in the
Court of J. Harlan Burns, Fifth Judicial District in and for the
County of Washington.

The jury found appellant not guilty of

theft, but guilty of attempted theft on each count.(R 111-116)
On December 23, 1985, appellant filed a Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.(R 121)
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That motion was denied by the Honorable J. Harlan Burns
on January 13, 1986 and appellant was sentenced on that same
date.

Appellant was sentenced to 360 days in the Washington

County Jail, which was stayed and he was placed upon probation on
condition he serve 90 days in the county jail, make restitution
in the amount of $1,208.76, the value of the cattle allegedly
stolen, and other conditions.
Thereafter, appellant, on January 14, 1986, filed his
Application for Certificate of Probable Cause which was denied by
the Honorable J. Harlan Burns on January 28, 1986.(R 140)
In lieu of filing an Application for a Certificate of
Probable Cause with this Court, appellant filed his Notice of
Appeal on January 30, 1986.(R-146)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, KIP ROLAND PARKIN, was living in Nephi,
Utah, during the month of February 1985 (TR P 149, LL 16-22) when
he made a trip to St. George, Utah on February 26, 1985 to work
on a short term job for his employer, Jim Jones, a brick mason.
(TR P 150, LL 4-11)
Upon arriving, in the afternoon, in St. George,
appellant chanced to meet one K.C. COOMBS (TR P 152, LL 21-25; P
153, LL 1) an acquaintance since grade school from Nephi. (TR P
151, LL 18-22)
Coombs invited appellant to stay at his apartment while
in St. George. (TR P 153, LL 6-10)
Appellant checked in with his employer and arranged to
start work the next morning. (TR P 153, LL 23-25; P 154, LL 1-8)
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After returning to Coombs' apartment and cleaning up,
Coombs invited appellant to ride out to Washington fields to show
him where he had, according to Coombs, recently participated in
motocross motorcycle races, (TR P 154, LL 16-25; P 154, LL 1)
which they did, riding around in the area for some time.
On the next day, after appellant had completed work for
the day, Coombs asked him if he could borrow appellant's pick-up
truck. (TR P 158, LL 8-13)
Appellant first declined to let Coombs use the truck
because it belonged to appellant's grandfather, but later felt
guilty because Coombs had let him stay at his apartment, so
offered to assist Coombs himself with the truck. (TR P 158, LL
22-25; P 159, LL 1-4)
Coombs told appellant he had promised a friend to take
some cattle from St. George to Cedar City to a cattle auction.
(TR P 159, LL 5-11)
Coombs had prearranged for cattle racks for the pick-up
from another friend (TR P 160, LL 8-14) and they then went to the
Washington Fields area where Coombs had taken appelant the day
before showing him where the motorcycle races had been held.
They drove to a corral where they loaded six head of cattle into
the truck and drove them to the auction yard in Cedar City after
stopping in Washington, Utah, at a 7-Eleven convenience store, to
get gasoline. (TR P 161, LL 21-25; P 162, LL 1-23)
The cattle were unloaded at the auction yard in Cedar
City late that night.

The next day, appellant returned to the

auction yard with Coombs in Coombs' car because his job in St.
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George was completed, and Coombs wanted company on the ride to
Cedar City. (TR P 164f LL 13-25; P 165, LL 1-6)
After the cattle were sold at the auction, and the
check given to Coombs, appellant noticed the check was made out
to "Coombs," and he became concerned.

After Coombs took the

check to the bank and cashed it, appellant became more than
concerned, he became suspicious. (TR P 167, LL 9-24)
Shortly thereafter, on the way home from Cedar City,
appellant confronted Coombs three seperate times about the check
and was finally told by Coombs, only on the third time, that the
cattle had actually been stolen. (TR P 167, LL 22-25; P 168, LL
1-17)
Coombs, before telling appellant th§t the cattle were
stolen had given appellant $120.00 for gas and for the use of his
truck and an additional ten dollars which he owed appellant. (TR
P 168, LL 22-25; P 169, LL 1-16)
The check given to Coombs at the auction yard was for
$1,462.45. (Record exhibit list)
Appellant denied that he had been told by Coombs prior
to that time, or that he knew, that the cattle were in fact being
stolen rather than transported for a friend of Coombs, as he
insisted Coombs had told him. (TR P 160, LL 1-3; P 175, LL 21-25;
P 176, LL 1-7; P 186, LL 20-24; P 187, LL 5-12)
Coombs, himself, was subsequently arrested for, and
pled guilty to, not only stealing the six head of cattle on
February 27, 1985, the incident involving appellant, but for a
second incident in January 1985 for a third incident in March

4

1985f and for a fourth incident in Iron County, the latter three
incidents all unrelated to appellant, (TR P 97, LL 13-25; P 98 LL
1-13) totalling 16 counts. (TR P 98, LL 14-25)
Coombs, as an incident to a plea bargain, agreed to
plead to only 4 counts of theft and to testify against appellant,
in exchange for which, the remaining 12 counts were dismissed.
(TR P 99, LL 7-25; P 100, LL 1-25; P 101, LL 1-5)

He had not

been sentenced at the time of the trial of appellant.
In contradiction to the testimony of appellant, Coombs
also testified during the trial, that he either had told
appellant, or that he thought appellant knew, that the cattle
were being stolen when they were being loaded into the pickup
truck and taken to the auction yard. (TR P 77, LL 9-14 et al)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant either by stipulation or by admission during
his testimony acknowledged or admitted all of the elements of the
crime of theft of the cattle except the element of intent to
steal or to unlawfully deprive the owner of the property.
The jury found appellant not guilty of theft.

Since it

found him not guilty, in the face of the aforementioned
stipulations and admissions, the jury could only have so found
for the reason that it did not believe he possessed the requisit
knowledge or intent to commit a theft, the only element to which
he did not admit or stipulate.
Since the offense of attempted theft, pursuant to
§76-4-101 of the Utah Code requires that the appellant must have
acted n . . .with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
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the commission of the offense . • ." itself, and the jury verdict
of not guilty of the offense of "theft" could only reflect a
determination by the jury that appellant had not had that
requisit intent, appellant could not be guilty of attempted theft
either.
ARGUMENT
The simple issue before the Court is whether the
appellant having admitted all elements of the crime of theft
except intent and having been found not guilty of theft, which by
process of elimination could only be because the jury found he
did not have the intent to commit the crime, could he
nevertheless be found guilty, by the jury, of attempted theft,
which requires the same intent as is required for theft?
I. JURY'S FAILURE TO CONVICT APPELLANT OF THEFT
CONSTITUTES AN ACQUITAL OF THAT OFFENSE.
The Court instructed the jury that the elements of the
crime of theft are as follows:
1.

That the offense, if any, occurred at and within
Washington County, State of Utah.
2. That the offense, if any, occurred on or about the
26th day of February, 1985, although the exact date
is immaterial.
3. That at said time and place the defendant, Kip
Roland Parkin, knowingly and intentionally obtained
and exercised unauthorized control over the
property of another, to-wit: one heifer calf
belonging to LeMoyne Esplin. (Each of the other 5
counts listed a seperate animal)
4. That the said defendant, Kip Roland Parkin, had the
purpose and intent to permanently deprive the owner
of such property.(R 85, 87, 89, 91, 93 & 95)
Appellant, during his testimony, admitted, or
stipulated to, all the Elements of #1 and #2 in their entirety.
He also admitted all portions of Element #3 except that ". . .he
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knowingly and intentionally obtained and exercised unauthorized
control . . . " over the property of another.
Appellant also denied the allegations that he had the
purpose and intent to permanently deprive the owner of the
property, because he thought he was assisting one K.C. Coombs
transport the cows with the owner's knowledge and consent.
Appellant admitted that the cows were picked up in
Washington County, transported to Cedar City for sale at the
auction yard, were sold and the money for the dows paid to K.C.
Coombs by the auction yard.
If appellant knew he, or Coombs, did not have the
permission and consent of the owner to do those acts, he would be
guilty of theft, nothing less!
Nevertheless, in spite of conflicting evidence (i.e.
the testimony of himself and the testimony of K.C. Coombs) the
jury found him, the appellant, not guilty of theft (see verdict
[R 111-116]) .
The jury could only reach that verdict by a finding
that he had not had the requisite intent.
In Green v. United States, 355 US 184, 2 L ed 2d 199,
78 S.Ct. 221, 61 ALR 2d 1119, the United States Supreme Court
considered a case in which the defendant, Green had been charged
with arson and murder.

The Trial Court had given instructions on

both first degree and second degree murder. The jury found Green
guilty of arson and 2nd degree murder.

On remand, at the end of

a second trial, the jury this time found Green guilty of first
degree murder.
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The Court, however, held that the failure to convict
the defendant Green of first degree murder, while convicting him
of second degree murder, in the first trial constituted an
acquital of the first degree murder charge and he could not be
retried on the first degree murder charge because of double
jeopardy.
Appellant submits likewise, that in this case, the
failure of the jury to find him guilty of theft constitutes an
acquital of that charge, eventhough it purported to find him
guilty of attempted theft, a lesser included offense, with which
he had not been originally charged.
An acquital of the charge of theft, could only occur
because the jury failed to find the element of intent on the part
of appellant.
II. AN ATTEMPTED THEFT REQUIRES THE ACTOR HAVE THE
SAME INTENT REQUIRED AS FOR THE CRIME OF THEFT
Section 76-4-101 of the Utah Code provides as follows:
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an
attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for the commission of
the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not
constitute a substantial step unless it is strongly
corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the
offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually
committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the
offense could have been committed had the
attendant circumstances been as the actor believed
them to be. (Emphasis added)
In other words, in order to commit the crime of
attempted theft, the appellant must have been acting with the
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same intent that would have been required to commit the crime of
theft.
Obviously, the intent of the legislature is to punish
one for attempting to commit a crime even if, because of the
intervention of some outside force or the actor1s ineptitude, he
is unsuccessful in completing the crime.

It was clearly not the

intent of the legislature to excise intent as an element of the
lesser included crime of attempted theft.
In this case, the act or acts necessary to commit a
theft were consummated, so that only the intent of the appellant
was left to the jury to determine.
Respondent may argue that subsection (3)(a) of
§76-4-101 provides that: ". . . (3) no defense,to the offense of
attempt shall arise: (1) Because the offense was actually
committed. . ." and therefore appellant could be guilty of an
attempt even though not guilty of the crime itself.
That rationale fails to take into consideration,
however, the definition of the word offense as used in §76-4-101.
"Offense" clearly requires a finding that intent to
commit the offense was present.

Subsection (2) of 76-4-101 the

attempt statute provides very specifically:
"For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute
a substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative
of the actor's intent to commit the offense. (Emphasis
added)
Therefore, if there was no intent, there could be no
crime of attempt, even if all other acts were, in fact,
accomplished.
The jury found there was no such intent!
9

III. ACQUITTAL OF APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF THEFT
MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVICT HIM OF ATTEMPTED THEFT WHERE THE
ONLY ISSUE FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE WAS "INTENT."
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Many cases throughout the land hold that there cannot
be a conviction for an attempt unless there is intent to commit
the crime and an ineffective act done toward its commission.

See

for example: People v. Buffrom, 256 P2d 317 page 321f People v.
Werner, 105 P2d 927 page 931; People v. Lylesf 319 P2d 745
page 747; State v. Crowel, 414 P2d 50 page 53; State v. Beremonf
276 P2d 364 page 365; Ervin v. State, 351 P2d 401 page 405, Place
v. State, 300 P2d 666; Vandiver v. State, 261 P2d 617.
It may be argued that the adoption of §76-4-101 (3) (a)
by the legislature rejected the widespread rule that there can be
no conviction of an attempt if the act was in fact consumated,
but even if it does, it does not abolish the requirement that
there must be an intent to commit the offense in order to convict
the appellant of an attempt to commit the offense.
Lewis v. People, 235 P.2d 348, a Colorado case, deals
with an almost identical principal.

In that case, the charges

submitted to the jury were that the defendant took indecent
liberties (three counts) with a child under the age of 14 years
and that he attempted to take indecent liberties with a child
under the age of 14 years. The jury found the defendant not
guilty of the three counts of taking indecent liberties with the
child, but did find him guilty of attempting to take indecent
liberties with the child.
The Court, on page 350, asked the question:
...where a verdict of not guilty is returned in
connection with each count of the information
10

which charges the commission of the completed
offense will a verdict of guilffy, returned by the
jury upon a count charging an attempt to take
immodest, improperf immoral and indecent
liberties, be upheld? (Emphasis in original)
The answer was in the negative.

On page 351, the Court

stated:
...The evidence offered in support of the
information, if believed, could only lead to the
conclusion in the mind of a reasonable person that
the indecent, immodest, or immoral liberty had
been completely consummated.
By the verdict of
not guilty upon the first, second and third counts
of the information the jury rejected the testimony
offered by the people as being insufficient to
establish the guilt off the defendant upon the
only counts of the information which the evidence
tended to prove.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment of the
trial court should be, and hereby is, reversed,
and the cause remanded with directions to
discharge the defendant.
In the instant case, the jury, faced with admissions
and stipulations of all of the elements of the offense except the
element of intent or knowledge required by the statute to
complete the offense, found the appellant not guilty of the crime
of theft.

To follow the logic and rationale of Lewis, then, the

judgment of guilty of attempted theft should be reversed.
In State v. O'Neil, 167 P.2d 471, the same concept is
illustrated in another way.

In that case, the defendant was

charged with two counts. One count was an assault count and the
second was a first-degree burglary count.

Under the law of

Washington where the case was decided, one of the elements of
first-degree burglary is that there be an assault. Without the
assault element, the offense is only second-degree burglary.
The jury found the Defendant not guilty of assault, but
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guilty of attempted first-degree burglary a lesser included
offense of the first-degree burglary count.
The court held that since the jury found the defendant
not guilty of assault, and since assault was an essential element
of the first-degree burglary charge, there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding of guilty of attempted first-degree
burglary.
The court stated on page 474:
The appellant's assertion is irrefutable that the
verdict on the second count finding him guilty of
an assault is inconsistent with the verdict
returned on the first count which found him guilty
of burglary in the second degree for the reason
that section 460 of the Penal Code specifically
classifies burglary accompanied by an assault on
any person as burglary of the first degree.
* * *

Having found that the defendant was guilty of
burglary of the second-degree, the necessary
inference is that the jury must have assumed he
made no assault. This verdict, in effect,
constituted an acquittal of the first degree of
burglary and the charge of an assault included
therein. This determination that there was no
actual assault is in irreconcilable conflict with
the verdict on the second count of the effect that
he was guilty of an assault, for both counts of
the information were based on the same transaction
which occurred at the same time and place. Since
both counts are based on the same transaction and
the finding of the jury on the first count refutes
the possibility of the commission of the offense
by means of an assault, the verdict on the second
count is void and should be set aside. (Emphasis
added)
Appellant here submits that precisely the same
principal and the same logic must apply.

By its verdict of not

guilty of theft, under the fact situation that exists in this
case, the jury could only have concluded that the appellant did
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not have the requisite intent or knowledge to commit a theft and
since that same intent or knowledge is necessary for a conviction
of attempted theft, as well as for theft itselfr there is not
sufficient evidence to support the conviction of attempted theft.
-IB Booth

v. State,

398 P*2d 863, an Oklahoma case,

in

dealing with a situation involving attempting to receive money by
false pretenses, the court noted:
An accused cannot be convicted of an attempt to
commit a crime unless he could have been convicted
of the crime itself if his attempt had been
successful. Where the act, if accomplished, would
not constitute the crime intended, there is no
indictable attempt.
In this case, even though the act was completed, the
act must be Coupled with intent, as required by Section 76-4-101,
and there could be no such crime because the jury had already
determined that appellant did not have the requisite intent or
knowledge to commit the offense, hence the rationale of the
Oklahoma Couirt in Booth, supra, is applicable.
CONCLUSION
Ths appellant, KIP ROLAND PARKIN, respectfully submits
that because of his acquittal by the jury of the crime of theft,
there is insufficient evidence upon which to sustain the verdict
of guilty of attempted theft and the verdict of guilty of
attempted thQft should be reversed and^judgment of acquittal
entered.
Dated this

j --" day of

Ju'ftacArthurWright
'
J
•Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
60 N. 300 E.f P.O. Box 339
St. George, UT 84770
Phone: 628-2612
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